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EVIDENCE-SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STANDARD OF REVIEW RAISES
QUESTIONS OF FIT. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. V. JOINER, 118 S. Ct. 512
(1997).
I. INTRODUCTION
Expert witnesses have long been called upon to testify as to issues of fact
that lie outside the range of common knowledge. The maxim "cuique in sua
arte credendum," everyone is to be believed in his own art, has historically
been cited as the basis for this practice.'
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,2 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the proper
standard of review in reversing a trial court's decision to exclude certain expert
testimony.3 The Court held that abuse of discretion is the proper standard for
an appellate court to apply in reviewing a trial court's evidentiary ruling,4
concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
plaintiff s expert testimonyf
The Court's previous consideration of scientific evidence in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals6 defined the trial court's gate-keeping role in
screening evidence for scientific validity, but it failed to establish a clear
standard for appellate courts reviewing these determinations.7
This casenote discusses the standard of review applied to the admissibility
of scientific evidence prior to and in light of General Electric Co. v. Joiner.
Following a discussion of the facts, the note addresses the appellate review of
evidentiary rulings both prior to and following the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Next, it reviews the Court's reasoning and, finally,
considers the addition of Joiner to this framework and the impact of the
decision on future litigation.
II. FACTS
In 1973, Robert Joiner went to work as an electrician for the Water &
Light Department of the City of Thomasville, Georgia As a part of his duties,
he worked with the city's electrical transformers.9 These transformers used a
1. See generally Winans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88 (1858).
2. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
3. See id. at 515.
4. See id. The Court announced its ruling in an eight to one decision with Justice Stevens
concurring in part and dissenting in part. See id.
5. See id.
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. See David G. Savage, Judge's Gatekeeper Role Expanded, 84 A.B.A.J. 41 (1998).
8. See General Electric v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 515 (1997).
9. See id. at 515-16.
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mineral oil based dielectric fluid' ° as a coolant." In order to make repairs,
Joiner had to reach into this fluid with his hands and arms, sometimes splashing
small amounts into his eyes and mouth. 2 In 1983, after Joiner had been
working with this fluid for nearly ten years, the city discovered that one in five
of the transformers was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).13
Congress banned the production and sale of PCBs in 1978, fearing that they
presented a hazard to human health. '4
Joiner was diagnosed with small cell lung cancer in 1991, at the age of
thirty-seven. 5 He had been a cigarette smoker at one time but had quit ten
years before his diagnosis. 6 Both of Joirer's parents were smokers, and there
was a history of lung cancer in his family.'7
Joiner filed suit against General Electric Company, a manufacturer of
transformers with PCBs, in state court in Georgia. 8 The suit alleged that
Joiner's exposure to PCBs promoted his cancer, causing it to develop years
earlier than it might have otherwise, if at all."' The defendants removed the
case to federal court in the Northern District of Georgia.2°
In district court, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that there was no admissible scientific evidence that PCBs promoted
Joiner's cancer and that there was no evidence that Joiner was exposed to
significant amounts of PCBs.2' In response to the first ground, Joiner presented
the testimony of two expert witnesses, who testified that PCBs alone could
promote cancer and that Joiner's exposure to PCBs was likely responsible for
his development of lung cancer.22 Dr. Arnold Schecter stated that he believed
it was more likely than not that cigarette smoking and exposure to PCBs caused
10. A dielectric is an insulator that is highly resistant to electrical current. See BERNARD
GROB, BASIC ELECTRONICS 219 (4th ed. 1977).
11. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 515-16.
12. See Joiner v. General Electric, 78 F.3d 524, 528 (11 th Cir. 1996).
13. See id. PCBs were developed in order to make the dielectric fluid fire resistant. See
Joiner v. General Electric, 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 524 (11 th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
14. See Act of Oct. It, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2020 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §
2605 (1994)). Congress viewed PCBs as "presenting an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment." 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994).
15. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 516.
16. See Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1312. Joiner smoked as much as a pack of cigarettes per
day for approximately eight years. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1314.
19. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 516. The suit also alleged exposure to furan and dioxin
derivatives of PCBs. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 528.
22. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 516.
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Joiner's cancer.23 Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum testified that Joiner's exposure to
PCBs was a significant factor in his subsequent development of small cell lung
cancer.24 The experts based their opinions on toxicological animal studies and
epidemiological studies.25
The animal studies involved direct injections of PCBs into infant mice in
concentrations many times higher than that to which Joiner had been exposed.26
The cancers the mice developed were of a different type than Joiner had
developed.27 Further, no studies demonstrated the promotion of cancer in any
species other than mice.2"
The four epidemiological studies involved manufacturing employees who
had been exposed to PCBs in the course of their work.29 In Italy, ex-workers
from a capacitor plant showed a higher than expected death rate from lung
cancer, but the study concluded that there were no grounds for associating lung
cancer deaths and exposure in the plant.30 In Illinois, workers at Monsanto's
PCB production plant also showed a higher than expected rate of lung cancer
death, yet the study concluded that the increase was not statistically
significant3 and did not suggest a link between the increased death rates and
23. See id. at 518. Arnold Schecter, M.D., M.P.H., is a tenured medical professor and
works full time doing research on the toxic effects of PCBs, furans and dioxins. See Brief for
Respondent at 10, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997) (No. 96-188). He has
published over 100 peer-reviewed papers on this subject. See id. Schecter has also served as
a consultant to the EPA, the U.S. Public Health Service, the National Academy of Sciences, and
the World Health Organization with respect to their study of PCBs, furans and dioxins. See id.
at 10-11. Schecter conducts a practice focused upon persons involved in litigation, particularly
claims about PCBs. See Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct.
512 (1997) (No. 96-188).
24. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518. Dr. Teitelbaum, co-founder of both the American
Academy of Clinical Toxicology and the American Board of Medical Toxicology, teaches a
variety of graduate-level courses in occupational and environmental toxicology and the
epidemiology of toxic diseases and has published more than forty articles on these subjects. See
Brief for Respondent at 17, Joiner (No. 96-188). Dr. Teitelbaum described himself as a
practicing toxicologist but admitted in his testimony that he testifies as many as 40 times per
year and spends a minority of his time on unspecified patient care. See Brief for Petitioner at
37, Joiner (No. 96-188).
25. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518. Epidemiological studies examine patterns of disease
incidence in human populations. See generally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 411 (Charles B. Clayman, MD ed., Random House 1989).
26. Joiner had been exposed to a fluid containing between zero and 500 parts per million
PCBs. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518.
27. See id. The mice developed alveologenic adenomas while Joiner had developed small-
cell carcinomas. See id.
28. See Joiner, 864 F. Supp. 1324.
29. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct at 518-19.
30. See id.
31. Statistical significance relates to the probability of achieving similar results purely by
chance. See DAVID H. VOELKER & PETER Z. ORTON, STATISTICS 163 (1993).
1998]
UALR LAW REVIEW
exposure to PCBs. 32 In Norway, workers at a cable manufacturing plant who
had been exposed to mineral oil did show a statistically significant increase in
lung cancer deaths, but there was no mention of PCBs.3 3 In Japan, a PCB-
exposed group showed a statistically significant increase in lung cancer deaths,
but the group had also been exposed to numerous other potential carcinogens. 4
The defendants countered that none of these studies could support the
experts' opinions and moved for summary judgment. 35  The district court
agreed and granted the motion, ruling that while there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, Joiner had failed
to demonstrate that there was a causal link between exposure to PCBs and lung
cancer.36 The court believed that the testimony of Joiner's experts did not rise
above the witness' mere belief or speculation 37 and held that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans
38or dioxins.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Federal
Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony favor admissibility.39 Citing this
preference, the court stated that it applied a stringent standard of review' to the
trial court's exclusion and concluded that the district court should limit its role
to determining the "legal reliability"'4 of expert testimony, leaving the jury to
32. See Joiner, 118S. Ct. at519.
33. See id. at 519.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 518-19. The four studies the Court cited involved PCB exposure varying
in character and degree. See id. Two of the four failed to produce statistically significant
evidence that there was any link between exposure to PCBs and increased incidence of cancer.
See id. A third simply made no mention of PCBs. See id. The fourth produced statistically
significant results but failed to isolate PCBs as the cause among several carcinogens to which
the workers were exposed. See id.
36. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 516.
37. See Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1326. This is an application of the standard outlined in
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, where the court stated that scientific knowledge as
presented by an expert witness implies something more than "subjective belief or unsupported
speculation." See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
38. See Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1326.
39. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529.
40. See id. See also Andrew 1. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly Fine
Line Between the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65
ANTITRUST L. J. 663, 705-06 (1997).
41. Reliability is a term of art used in science and statistics to refer to the reproducibility
of results. See generally KENNETH R. FOSTER and PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE 11
(1997). A reliable scientific test can be repeated under similar circumstances and produce
similar results. See id. Even if the results are consistently wrong, the test is still considered
reliable, though perhaps not scientifically valid. See id. Legal reliability, however, requires
more. See id. Legal reliability refers to scientific validity as that level of reliability as outlined
by Daubert. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90. "The trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id.
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decide upon the validity of that testimony. 2 Joiner construed this to mean that
the Eleventh Circuit had applied the abuse of discretion standard and that the
trial court had abused its discretion by focusing on the experts' conclusions
rather than the methodology that the experts had used in reaching that
conclusion.43 The defendants' decision to challenge Joiner's case through a
summary judgment motion instead of challenging the admissibility of the
expert testimony directly through a motion in limine led the trial court, and thus
the Eleventh Circuit, into the predicament of having to review a summary
judgment decision based upon admissibility rationale."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari45 to determine the
standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision
to admit or exclude expert testimony. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit,
concluding that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review and that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. 6
IT[. BACKGROUND
This section will review the early cases involving the admission of expert
testimony for historical perspective. Then the modem standards will be
considered beginning with Frye v. United States,47 moving on to the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and ending with Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.48
A. Early Cases
In Winans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 9 one of the earliest cases on
expert evidence, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the parties could
use the testimony of experts in the field to explain questions of science or terms
of art.5" The Court recognized, however, that the number of differing expert
opinions could be endless and thus concluded that a trial court could properly
exclude their testimony if it so desired.5 To justify this conclusion, the Court
cited the amount of time "wasted" in cross-examination testing the skill and
42. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
43. See id.
44. See Gavil, supra note 40, at 706.
45. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).
46. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519.
47. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
48. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
49. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88 (1858).
50. Seeid. at 101.
51. See id.
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knowledge of such experts, as well as the possibility for jury confusion on the
very question the expert was to clarify. 2 The following year, the Court
decided Ogden v. Parsons,3 reviewing a trial court's reliance on expert
testimony. 4 Without announcing which standard it was applying, the Court
simply concluded that the lower court had not erred by allowing the experts to
testify." In 1878, the Court decided Spring v. Edgar,6 recognizing that
exclusion or admission of evidence is within the trial court's discretion and that
an appeals court should not overturn these determinations unless the ruling is
"manifestly erroneous. 57
Collectively, these early cases acknowledge the usefulness of expert
opinion evidence, while recognizing that experts are likely to be in conflict.
5 8
To balance the necessity of expert testimony against possible abuses of opinion
evidence,59 the trial court must possess discretion over the admission or
exclusion of such testimony60 The fear that juries can be confused by cross-
examination as to the actual level of scientific controversy attached to a
particular issue is perhaps the most obvious abuse. 6' Also, the Third Circuit
implied in In Re Paoli R.R. Yard Litigation that judges might be prompted to
use their discretion over expert testimony to ensure that cases they perceive as
non-meritorious never reach a jury. 2
B. Frye v. United States
63
Frye marks the birth of modem standards for determining the admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence.64 Echoing the earlier cases,65 the Frye court conceded
52. See id.
53. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 167 (1859).
54. See id. at 170. Experts were called upon to testify as to what constituted a full cargo
for a ship that the plaintiff had chartered to carry a "full cargo of general merchandise." See id.
at 168. The court noted that "what was a full cargo for this ship to carry with safety... could
[not] be settled by any rule of law or mathematical computation..." thus the court necessarily
had to rely upon the opinions of the experts. See id. at 170.
55. See id.
56. 99 U.S. 645 (1878).
57. See id. at 658. The Court does indicate, however, that it is for the jury to decide how
much weight to give the proffered testimony. See id.
58. See Ogden, 64 U.S. (23 How.) at 170.
59. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLuM. L. REV. 2117, 2129 n.55 (1997).
60. See Spring, 99 U.S. at 658.
61. See Berger, supra note 59, at 2129 n.55.
62. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d Cir. 1994).
63. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
64. See Merlyn W. Clark, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Opinion,
39 ADvoc. (IDAHO) 10 (1996).
65. See Spring, 99 U.S. at 657. See also supra, the discussion of these cases in the Section
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that expert testimony by witnesses skilled in a particular field was admissible
as to questions beyond common experience or knowledge.6 The court limited
admissibility by declaring that the scientific principles from which experts
gather their opinions must be "generally accepted" within the field.67
Although courts disagree as to the precise meaning of general acceptance, it is
generally agreed that unanimous consensus is not necessary; but instead, most
formulations seem to envision that acceptance within the scientific community
be significant either in number or expertise.68
Frye stood as the dominant standard in the federal courts until the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, though Frye's replacement
was not fully recognized until the Court incorporated it into the Daubert
standard in 1993.69 Many criticized the Frye standard as being too restrictive
on a trial court's discretion to exclude a flood of low value or "junk" science 70
arguing that some discretion is necessary to prevent the jury from being "awed"
by expert evidence.7' This reflects what Judge Posner referred to as scientific
rhetoric's deceitful potential.72
C. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular Rule
702, 73 called into question the continued application of the Frye standard by
making no mention of its "general acceptance" standard.74 The Supreme Court,
however, did not address this concern until it decided Daubert in 1993." 5
III A.
66. SeeFrye, 293 F. at 1014.
67. See id.
68. See generally Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye
v. United States, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
69. See Clark, supra note 64, at 10.
70. See Clark, supra note 64, at 10. But cf. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 149 (asserting that
Frye is consistent with the "social character of human knowledge" by recognizing that,
philosophically at least, there is no standpoint from outside of science from which anyone can
weigh the scientific merit of proffered scientific testimony).
71. See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 149.
72. See R.A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 525 (1995).
73. FED. R. EvD. 702 "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
74. See id.
75. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
1998]
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Rule 702 establishes a three-part test for the admissibility of expert
testimony.76 First, the subject of the proffered testimony must be knowledge
of a scientific, technical, or other specialized character.77 Second, the testimony
must assist the fact finder in understanding the evidence or determining a fact
in question.7 ' Finally, the witness must be qualified as an expert by either
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.79 The rule also allows, but
does not require, the expert to testify in the form of an opinion.80 Courts
recognized and applied the second and third parts of this test for many years,
leaving the first element, the knowledge test, unrefined until Daubert.8 1
Rule 403,82 often considered in conjunction with Rule 702, requires that
probative value of the evidence be weighed against such issues as jury
confusion, prejudice, undue delay, or cumulative presentation of evidence. 8a
This reflects the second prong of the Rule 702 test of admissibility but also
establishes an independent level of review when an expert gives an opinion that
borders on a legal conclusion.8s
D. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Co.
In 1993, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Daubert to decide the
proper standard for admitting expert testimony.85 First, the Court expressly
held that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye
general acceptance standard and that there was no indication that the Rules
were intended to incorporate the Frye standard.86 The Court then moved on to
consider the limits the Rules themselves imposed upon admissibility, focusing
on the first prong of the Rule 702 test.
76. See Lee Loevinger, Commentary on Evidentiary Framework, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 149,
153 (1996).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. (citing Beins v. United States, 695 F.2d 591, 608-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982); and
United States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 569 (10th Cir. 1992)).
82. FED. R. EvID. 403 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." Id.
83. See id.
84. See Loevinger, supra note 76, at 154.
85. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-87. The Court cited sharp division between the circuits
as its basis for granting certiorari. See id. at 585.
86. See id. See also FED. R. EvID. 702.
87. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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The Court established that a trial court's "gatekeeping" function extends
both to the legal reliability of the scientific method employed, and to the
showing that the method was properly applied to, or fit, the circumstances of
the case. 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred with the majority that the Federal
Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye standard, but dissented from the Court's
ruling with respect to scientific validity, complaining that the ruling would
oblige federal judges to become "amateur scientists."8 9
The reliability arm of the Daubert test provided that scientific knowledge
must be more than the subjective belief or speculation of the expert. 9° This
necessarily leads to a focus on the methodology underlying the expert's
opinion9'
The Court went on to explain that, under Rule 702, expert testimony must
be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case to aid the trier of fact in resolving a
factual dispute.92 Triers of fact must consider the fit between the supporting
data or study and the sufficiency of the showing that the method the expert
applied in reaching a conclusion was proper.93
While establishing a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence,
Daubert did not address the standard of review appeals courts should apply in
reviewing these determinations.94 This left the question of whether an appellate
court is to view the situation as one of admissibility or sufficiency, because the
two are not reviewed according to the same standard.95 Questions of admissi-
bility are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion where questions of
sufficiency, arising under a motion for summary judgment and motions for
judgment as a matter of law, are reviewed de novo.%
IV. REASONING
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had dissented in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,97 presented the Court's decision in General Electric Co. v.
88. See Clark, supra note 64, at 12.
89. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. See id. at 590.
91. See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 157. "Francois Jacob described the scientific method
as 'a constant dialogue between imagination and experiment that allows one to form an
increasingly fine-grained conception of what is called reality."' Loevinger, supra note 76, at
156 (quoting FRANcoIs JACOB, THE STATUE WrrHN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 225 (Franklin Philip
trans., 1988)).
92. See Clark, supra note 64, at 11.
93. See Clark, supra note 64, at 12.
94. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 597.
95. See Gavil, supra note 40, at 699.
96. See Gavil, supra note 40, at 699.
97. 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993).
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Joiner-8 in two stages. 9 First, the Court decided that the appropriate standard
of review to be applied when considering a district court's admission or
exclusion of scientific evidence is the abuse of discretion standard.' ° Second,
the Court applied this standard to the facts at hand and concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in this case by excluding Joiner's expert
testimony.1' 1 Joiner argued that the appeals court had applied the correct
standard in deciding that the trial court had erred in focusing on the experts'
conclusions rather than the underlying methodology they had used to reach
these conclusions.02 Finally, the Court remanded the case to the district court
to decide whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins'03 and whether
the testimony of Joiner's experts would then be admissible.""
General Electric argued that the Eleventh Circuit had erred in applying a
"particularly stringent"'0 5 standard of review to the trial court's exclusion of
Joiner's experts, because the traditional abuse of discretion review was
proper. 10 6 Joiner did not dispute that abuse of discretion was the proper
standard; instead, he suggested that the court of appeals had indeed applied this
standard.' 07 He explained that the use of the phrase "particularly stringent"
merely indicated that the court would devote more resources to considering
district court decisions that were outcome-determinative.1
08
A. Choosing the Appropriate Standard
The Supreme Court agreed that abuse of discretion is the proper standard
of review for a district court's evidentiary rulings,3 9 overturning the Eleventh
98. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
99. See id. at 515.
100. Seeid. at 517.
101. Seeid. at517-18.
102. Seeid. at518.
103. See id. at 519. This was necessary because the Eleventh Circuit had reversed the
district court's finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had
been exposed to furans and dioxins. See id. Joiner subsequently did not raise this issue on
appeal, thus the Supreme Court allowed the reversal to stand. See id.
104. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519.
105. See Joinerv. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d at 529. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the Federal Rules of Evidence's preference for admissibility justified this heightened review.
See id.
106. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
107. See id.
108. See id. The lower court's decision was outcome determinative in that it came out of
a motion for summary judgment instead of a direct challenge on admissibility through a motion
in limine. See Gavil, supra note 40, at 705-06 and accompanying text.
109. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
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Circuit's suggestion that the Court's holding in Daubert"o had altered this rule
in the context of the admissibility of scientific evidence.11' The Supreme Court
explained that Daubert did nothing to alter the traditional standard of
evidentiary review." 2 Rather Daubert simply held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence had displaced the Frye v. United States"13 standard of "general
acceptance"1 4 and left open the question of how these determinations are to be
reviewed upon appeal.' Daubert emphasized the trial court's role as
gatekeeper" 6 in screening expert testimony; but under Joiner, an appeals court
may not categorically distinguish between rulings that allow expert testimony
and rulings that exclude it. "' Abuse of discretion review applies in either
case."' The Court also rejected Joiner's contention that, because the exclusion
in this case was outcome-determinative, a more stringent standard of review
applied." 9 Questions of admissibility of evidence are issues of fact and,
therefore, are reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard. 1
20
B. Application of the Standard to the Facts
The majority applied this abuse of discretion standard to Joiner's facts.
Joiner's theory of the case rested upon the assertion that his exposure to PCBs
promoted his developing lung cancer.' 2' He supported this assertion with the
110. SeeDaubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
111. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 530.
112. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517. Daubert did not address the standard of appellate review
for evidentiary rulings. See id.
113. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
114. Frye held that the underlying scientific discovery or observation from which an
expert's testimony is deduced must be generally accepted in the relevant field of study. See id.
at 1014.
115. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517 (citing FED R. EVID. 702).
116. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The majority did not disagree with the Chief Justice's assessment, but preferred to root
the trial court's authority to screen scientific testimony firmly in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
See id. at 590.
117. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
118. See id. The Court cited two cases for this proposition: Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488
U.S. 153 (1988) (applying abuse of discretion review to a lower court's decision to exclude
evidence); and United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (applying abuse of discretion review
to a lower court's decision to admit evidence).
119. See id.
120. See id. Where the issues were dependent upon an interpretation of a federal rule of
evidence, the review would be de novo. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529.
121. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518.
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affidavits of two expert witnesses'2 who testified that his exposure to the
materials in question contributed to his cancer.
123
The experts supported their conclusions with animal and epidemiological
studies. 24 The trial court found persuasive the absence of studies demonstrat-
ing the promotion of cancer in any species other than mice. 125 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, reasoning that the trial court's role as gatekeeper extends only
to whether the formulation of the expert's opinion was methodologically sound
and not to whether the supporting study is in itself legally reliable.' 26 The
Supreme Court disagreed, finding the results of the studies to be so dissimilar
to Joiner's facts that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to reject
the experts' opinions.'27
The four epidemiological studies involved manufacturing employees who
had been exposed to PCBs in the course of their work.128 The trial court found
these studies unsupportive of the experts' conclusions because they either
lacked a statistically significant result or did not isolate PCBs as the sole
potential cause of a positive result. 29 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this
reasoning, stating that the trial court's focus should have been on the
underlying methodology the expert used in reaching a conclusion and not on
the correctness of that conclusion.1
30
The Supreme Court's analysis of these studies focused on methodology,
but the Court admitted that conclusions and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another. 3 ' Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the
Court concluded that it was within the trial court's discretion to analyze the
"fit" between the underlying data and the opinion proffered.
32
122. Dr. Arnold Schecter and Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum were the plaintiffs experts. See id.
123. Seeid. at518.
124. See id. See also supra Section II for a discussion of the details of these studies and
their conclusions.
125. See Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1324.
126. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 532.
127. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518-19.
128. See id. See also supra Section II for a discussion of the details of these studies and
their conclusions.
129. See Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1326. Applying Daubert, the trial court noted that under
Rule 702, the subject of an expert's testimony must be scientific knowledge. See id. The court
went on to conclude that the "knowledge" claimed by the experts did not rise above subjective
belief or unsupported speculation. See id.
130. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 533. The court stated that a trial court should satisfy itself as
to the legal reliability of an expert's testimony and leave the jury to decide upon its correctness.
See id.
131. See'Joiner, 118S. Ct. at519.
132. See id. The court explained that a district court is not required to admit opinion
testimony that is connected to the case only by the ipse dixit of the expert. See id.
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Although Joiner argued that a trial court's mere disagreement with an
expert's conclusion is not a proper basis for exclusion, the majority
disagreed.'33 Instead, it found that a district court may properly conclude that
the analytic distance between the expert's opinion and the data upon which he
bases that opinion is simply too great a span.'-" Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the scientific evidence in this case.
13
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to decide
whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and then to decide
whether the testimony of Joiner's experts would be admissible.
36
C. Minority Opinions
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer joined with the majority in
upholding the trial court's role as gatekeeper as described in Daubert.'37 He
alone maintained that judges are notscientists, and therefore lack the capability
to make determinations concerning scientific validity. 38  Taking note of
growing complexities in scientific data and litigation, he suggested that courts
make greater use of their authority to appoint experts to serve on behalf of the
court to aid in the pursuit of truth when science is the issue. 31
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority in holding abuse of discretion
as the proper standard of review, but he dissented from the Court's application
of that standard to the facts of this case."'4 He also expressed reservation as to
whether the Court's application was consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence
702 as interpreted in Daubert which suggests that a trial court is to merely
question an expert's methodology, not his conclusions. 4'
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. Arguably, the studies proffered could not support the conclusion that PCBs
promote cancer in humans at all, much less a person in Joiner's situation. See id.
136. See id. at 517.
137. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 520 (Breyer, J., concurring).
138. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
139. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). He suggested that established scientific organizations
could recommend reputable experts to the court to serve in this capacity. See id. (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
140. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 521 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens felt that this
question had not been properly briefed. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). For instance, Joiner's
experts relied on thirteen different studies as well as several reports from the World Health
Organization. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Only one of these studies actually appeared in
the record. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
141. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states that a witness
"qualified as an expert" may testify in the form of "opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
Daubert interpreted this as meaning that scientific testimony must be both "relevant and
reliable." See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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Justice Stevens argued that the relevance arm of Daubert's test is easily
applied. 142 The experts' testimony is relevant only if there is a question of
material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs or their deriva-
tives.'43 The majority correctly, then, directed the district court to reexamine
the admissibility of this evidence as it applied to Joiner's exposure to furans
and dioxins.'"
Justice Stevens had more trouble with the Court's application of the
reliability arm of the Daubert test. 45 He argued that the experts did not base
their opinions on any one of the studies discussed by the court but instead
based them upon the totality of all the relevant studies taken together. 46 In
other words, the district court considered the studies individually, as did the
majority, and concluded that none of them was sufficient to support the
proffered testimony. ' 4 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a so-
called "weight of the evidence" methodology 48 was a scientifically acceptable
means of drawing reliable conclusions. 4 9-The statements of Joiner's experts
indicate that this is the methodology they used in order to produce their
conclusions.150 Justice Stevens also pointed out language in Daubert that
advances the notion that the opportunity to debate such issues in open court is
the proper means of attacking "shaky" scientific evidence.' 5' Thus, Justice
Stevens concluded that it is not within a trial judge's discretion to exclude
scientific testimony when it fits the facts of the case and is based upon reliable
scientific methodology. 52 Interpretations of fit, then, separate Justice Stevens
from the majority.'53
142. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 521 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at
589).
143. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 522 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
145. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
148. Dr. Teitelbaum described this method of decision making as a thought process. See
id. (Stevens, J., concurring). The data collected from an epidemiological study is considered
in relation to what the scientist already knows about the substance in question and the subject's
exposure. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Dr. Teitelbaum then stated he simply "comes to a
conclusion." See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
149. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 532.
150. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 522.
151. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).
152. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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. V. SIGNIFICANCE
With the decision of General Electric v. Joiner,'4 trial and appellate
lawyers were hoping that the Court would better explain their duty under
Daubert and perhaps lessen the burden of an extensive, and expensive, hearing
on admissibility."' Instead, the Court provided a discussion that firmly
establishes Daubert's gatekeeping role. 156 Joiner, at its most basic level,
simply states that experts must explain their analysis sufficiently to overcome
any questions of fit between data and conclusion.157
Perhaps this decision affects lawyers and litigators most directly by
increasing the amount of work that must go into preparing expert evidence, or
at least not lessening it to pre-Daubert levels.5 8  The trial court's greater
discretion under the abuse of discretion standard enhances the importance of
the battle over expert testimony at the trial level, and Joiner does nothing to
alleviate this burden."' Litigators must be prepared to argue not only the
substance of an expert's opinion, but that the methodology employed in
reaching the conclusion was also legally reliable. 60
Whether the result in Joiner favors plaintiffs or defendants is open to
debate. Business defendants have hailed the decision as a victory under the
impression that it will now be more difficult for 'junk science' to be used in
court.1 61 Plaintiffs lawyers respond that the burden on the defendants' in
154. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
155. See Michael Hoenig, A Review Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence, Jan. 12,
1998, N.Y.L.J. at 3. "Those who hoped Joiner would provide a bright-line road map for
resolving most scientific expert disputes will be disappointed." Id.
156. See id.
157. See Lori Tripoli, Get Your Experts in Order after Joiner, Jan. 1998, PROD. LIAB. L. &
STRATEGY at I (quoting Richard S. Lewis, a plaintiffs' attorney and a partner at Cohen,
Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll in Washington, D.C.). An expert's analysis and testimony must
explain to the court how the expert reached his conclusion, and this explanation must not span
too great an analytic gap. See id.
158. See id. Daubert placed the admissibility of opinion evidence firmly into contention
between the parties by overruling the long-standing Frye "general acceptance" standard. See
id.
159. See Hoenig, supra note 155, at 3. "As before, but now punctuated more clearly, the
expert admissibility question is a veritable 'life and death' litigation crossroads." Hoenig, supra
note 155, at 3. See also Daniel D. Blinka, "Practical Inconvenience" or Conceptual
Confusion: The Common-Law Genesis of Federal Rule 703, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 467
(1997) ("Staring at a cold record armed with only an abuse of discretion standard of review,
appellate courts can be reluctant to second-guess trial judges with holdings that are extremely
fact intensive and, thus, of limited precedential value.").
160. See id.
161. See Hoenig, supra note 155, at 3. "Business groups cheered the majority opinion as
providing better balance in determining what sort of testimony can be admitted in cases
involving scientific evidence." Hoenig, supra note 155, at 3.
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preparing experts is equally enhanced. 162 There will also be great importance
attached to who is sitting on the bench, now for their scientific perspectives as
well as their legal views. 63 This opens the door to questions of uniformity;
similar cases may or may not go to the jury, depending upon the judge.'64
Joiner reminds judges that the Federal Rules of Evidence place limits
upon the admissibility of scientific evidence. 65  The Court placed Joiner
squarely on top of the Daubert framework by stressing that the legal reliability
of expert conclusions must be considered along with the validity of their
underlying methodology."s6 This full disclosure, allowing the trial court to use
the evidence for the same purpose the expert did, lessens the risk that experts
will decide for themselves what evidence jurors should hear by applying their
own ill-defined standards. 167 Prospects on appeal will depend greatly upon the
quality of the Daubert advocacy at trial.'
68
Joiner also relays a message to scientists and other expert witnesses.
Experts will likely be called upon to testify as to the merits of other experts.
169
This could result in increased costs for hearings to determine the admissibility
of expert evidence. 70 In toxic or mass tort cases such as those concerning
breast implants or Gulf War Syndrome, the pace of science might lag far
behind the legal need for a remedy.' 7' Market pressures aggravate this problem
162. See Tripoli, supra note 157, at I (quoting Mark Behrens, an attorney at Washington
D.C.'s Crowell & Moring).
163. See Mark A. Hofiman, Business Applauds 'Junk Science" Ruling, Dec. 22, 1997, Bus.
INS. at 1.
164. See Hofinan, supra note 163, at 1. "It creates a system where the exact same cases will
go to the jury in front of one judge and not to a jury in front of some other judges, which may
save appellate courts some work but is hardly the best way to run the system if you're interested
in uniformity of result." Hofman, supra note 163, at 1.
165. See Hoenig, supra note 155, at 3.
166. See Hoenig, supra note 155, at 3.
Sometimes, the conclusory leaps trial experts make from data purported to support
them are too gigantic but get to the jury nonetheless because they are masked in
scientific terms and formulae. The Court's language... invites judges to unmask
such disguises and expose the analytical gaps. Obviously, counsel opposing the
expert testimony must take the laboring oar on such challenges.
Hoenig, supra note 155, at 3.
167. But cf Blinka, supra note 159 (arguing that this leaves no sensible stopping point in
the trial court's inquiry, leading perhaps into a reliance on otherwise inadmissible information).
168. See Hoenig, supra note 155, at 3.
169. See Roman M. Silberfeld, Daubert's Unintended Effect on the Scientific Community,
Feb. 1998, MED. LEGAL ASPECTS BREAST IMPLANTS at 1.
170. See id. "With peer review as the basis for the acceptance of an expert witness, over
time, we could face chains of experts testifying to the merits of other experts. I predict that it
won't be long before we see 'peer-group shopping' among plaintiffs and defendants." Id.
17 1. See id. "Redress of injury for harmful products cannot stand still for the completion
of broad, double-blind studies that can take decades." Id. "[T]hat evidence of causation is
lacking.. . does not mean a causal link does not exist." Id.
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by providing little incentive for carrying out the type of research that might be
legally necessary to afford a remedy."'a Testing is costly and time consuming
and adds little to the marketability of a product.'73
With the decision in Joiner, the Supreme Court answered the call for
clarification of Daubert by providing a standard of review for appellate courts
considering trial court decisions to admit or exclude scientific evidence. 174 In
the process, the Court also provided guidance for trial courts making these
determinations by focusing on the fit between experts' testimony and the data
from which they draw their conclusions. 1
75
Russell D. Marlin
172. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 784 (1997).
173. See id,
174. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 515.
175. See Hofnan, supra note 163, at 1. "The ball is now in the trial court's court."
Hofinan, supra note 163, at I (quoting Quentin Riegel, deputy general counsel of the National
Association of Manufacturers).
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